Betrayal - Vice or Virtue?
An Ethical
Perspective on Accuracy in Simultaneous Interpreting
Kilian G. Seeber/Christian Zelger
In: Meta Vol. 52/2. Hrsg. von André
Clas. Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal. [ISSN
0026-0452]
1. Introduction
Simultaneous conference
interpreting is a relatively young profession. The first experiments with this
new technique of real time oral translation took place at the ILO in Geneva in
the late 1920ies, although the Nuremberg trials after World War II are often
considered the cradle of SI (simultaneous interpreting) as we know it today
(Gaiba, 1998).
Partly due to the creation of
international organizations and bodies such as the League of Nations
(predecessor of the UN) and the European Coal and Steal Community (which would
later evolve into the EU) and their need for multilingual communication, the
profession of conference interpreting has experienced a steady growth. After
little more than 50 years, SI has achieved a relatively high level of
professionalism. Many schools or university departments where the trade or art
of interpreting is taught are almost as old as the profession itself, such as
Geneva (ETI, Ecole de Traduction et d’Interprétation), founded in 1941, or
Paris (ESIT, Ecole Superieure des Interprètes et Traducteurs) in 1957. CIUTI (Conférence des instituts universitaires de
traduction et d'interprétation) has almost 30 member institutions, and AIIC
(Association international des interpretes de conférence), the only
international professional association for conference interpreters, comprises
over 2700 members worldwide.
With the professionalisation
of simultaneous interpreting the expectations both of users and employers have
risen considerably. Interpreters are required to undergo formal training and
pass tests to gain access to (i.e. get “accredited” with) certain international
organizations (e.g. the EU or the UN). Furthermore, they are expected to
perform in an increasingly (cognitively) demanding environment. A fundamental
aspect of this performance is the concept of being faithful to the speaker. In
other words, the interpreter is expected to accurately relay the message of the
speaker, not his own.
The aim of this paper is to
take a closer look at the notion of accuracy in simultaneous conference
interpreting, but to do so from an ethical rather than linguistic perspective.
As a matter of fact, we believe that certain instances which from a purely
linguistic point of view could be construed as betrayal may be discerned as the result of a sound ethical decision
if examined from a philosophical angle.
2. Conference interpreting and ethics
It is important to preface
our analysis by limiting its scope to the realm of simultaneous conference
interpreting, a particular form of interpreting performed in real time, i.e.
with a team of interpreters located in the conference room in soundproof
booths, listening to the original message over headphones and simultaneously
rendering that message through a microphone in the target language.
Such a setup has certain
repercussions on the communication process, as the intermediary (the
interpreter) is physically removed (usually relegated to the back of the room),
and thus unable to interrupt the speaker or ask for clarification (as he can do
when working in consecutive mode, where he is sitting close to the speaker and
his audience).
“So first class interpreters
are vital and the best are also a little bit creative. Some are quite happy to
improve the speakers’ words, even correct them where necessary […]” (Robbins,
2004)
The idea of conference
interpreters changing the original message at their discretion by adding to or
subtracting from it seems to be as popular as it is persistent (cf. Robbins,
2004). This begs the question about whether there are general guidelines
governing professional interpreter’s performance in order to ensure that they
do indeed render the original message. Such guidelines would most likely be
enshrined in the code of ethics of the international association of conference
interpreters. This document, first drafted in 1953 with the foundation of the
organization and updated several times (most recent update 1994) addresses
several issues pertaining to the ethical conduct of interpreters. However,
whereas the need for the interpreter's strictest secrecy, confidentiality and
collegiality - to mention just a few - are postulated explicitly, no reference
is made to the requirement of the interpreter faithfully relaying the original
message. This is particularly intriguing as other (national, regional or
specialized) professional organizations for interpreters stress the importance
of accuracy (e.g. NAD-RID, NAJIT). The distinctiveness of both sign language
interpreting and legal interpreting partially explains the particular attention
these organisations give to the notion of accuracy in interpreting.
Professionalization in sign language interpreting is coming about at a much
slower pace than in conference interpreting, particularly in community
settings. Consequently, it has not been unusual for untrained bilinguals to be
called upon to interpret for their friends and families. This means that the
dividing line between interpreter and speaker often blurred as the interpreter,
i.e. the speaker’s voice, turned into an advocate who champions the speaker’s
interests (Seeber 2002a,b,c). The legal setting, on the other hand, requires
particular attention to accuracy, as judge and jury assess the witnesses both
on the grounds of what they say and
how they say it (Mikkelson 1995, 2000).
What is more, the notion of
accuracy has been a perennial issue in the literature on written translation,
where several authors (Jakobson 1959, Nida 1964, Toury 1980, Snell-Hornby 1988,
Vermeer 1989, Baker 1992, Koller 1992, Pym 1992, Chesterman 1997, 2001, Venuti
1998 etc.) have suggested their own notion of accuracy, fidelity, equivalence,
correspondence or similarity qualifying it with at least as many adjectives
(formal, dynamic, grammatical, textual, pragmatic etc.). The literature on the
much younger discipline of simultaneous interpreting has addressed the issue of
inaccuracy mainly from the perspective of interpreting mistakes (Barik 1969,
Kopczynski 1980) and interpreting strategies (Sunnari 1995, Wadensjö 1998).
However, none of these authors considered a scenario in which the interpreter
deliberately alters the original message where such alteration is not imposed
by constraints such as time or mental resources. We ventured to explore
instances in which the interpreter chooses to alter, truncate or omit parts of the
message because of ethical reasons.
3. From accuracy to a truthful rendition
The dictionary defines
accuracy as ”freedom from mistake or error” or
“degree of conformity of a measure to a standard or a true value” (Webster’s
1993). Truth, on the other hand, is widely accepted as a basic value in our
society. To the philosopher, truth is "the quality of those propositions
that accord with reality, specifying what is in fact the case" (Audi 1995:
812). In SI this reality consists of the
message that the interpreter is asked upon to convey. The thorny issue is to
specify what the notion of message
entails.
We have seen before that SI is the
transfer of a spoken message into another language. As all languages are made
up of individual lexemes, a simplistic view of SI could see the process as a
transposition of these building blocks from the source language into the target
language. Such exercise could easily be performed by a computer (even more
efficiently and rapidly than by any human being) but its shortcomings are
obvious. Indeed, even at the dawn of the third millennium computer programs are
not able to produce satisfactory results given that a word for word translation
of the original very often fails to capture and/or render the meaning in the
target language. Consequently, semantic aspects must be taken into account in
order to offset the constraints imposed by a purely literal approach. This
means then, that the message is not solely contained in the building blocks of
a proposition P, but emerges from their interaction. Finally, given certain
pragmatic constraints, the interpreter may look beyond the words and their combined meaning and rely upon a third
message component, i.e. the underlying speaker’s intent.
We see therefore that the message comprises a verbal, a semantic
and an intentional component. According to the rationale laid out at the
beginning of this chapter, an accurate interpretation - which we will refer to
as truthful rendition - is one that
considers all three message components. These three components converge
whenever the analysis based on the verbal component alone yields the same
result as one including also the semantic as well as one considering all three
constituents. Whenever the analysis of the three message components produces
incongruent results, however, the interpreter must chose which message
components to base his interpretation on.
4. When heads of states become traffic cops
The following real-life example
should help elucidate our notion of a truthful rendition in simultaneous
interpreting. The below transcript is taken from an international conference
featuring several European and African heads of state and government for which
simultaneous interpretation into four languages is provided. The master of
ceremony, an Italian television talk show host, appears to be new to the
diplomatic and political arena. After the fervent intervention of the keynote
speaker (an African head of state) who passionately describes the deplorable
situation of children in his country, the MC addresses him as follows.
Interestingly, a spot survey
revealed that none of the interpreters working at the time rendered the last
sentence (personal communication). But what are the reasons driving the
interpreter to apparently betray the
speaker?
It seems warranted to claim
that likening a head of state, i.e. a high dignitary, to a traffic cop is
offensive regardless of the cultural background of the addressee. We believe
the interpreter realized that it cannot possibly be the master MC’s intention
to insult one of the guests of honor. This is why beyond the verbal and
semantic message components the interpreter decided to integrate the third
component, i.e. the intention of the speaker. As we already pointed out, this
decision taken by the interpreter is the result of an ongoing monitoring
process, therefore an action essential
for his job. We will briefly explore what philosophical theories such actions
can be based upon.
5. Teleological vs. deontological theories of ethics
Ethics, the study of
morality, can be divided into the general study of goodness, the general study
of right action, applied ethics, meta-ethics, moral psychology, and metaphysics
of moral responsibility (Audi 1995: 244). Moreover, ethics can have different
objects of study, from values and norms to intentions and actions or
consequences. As an action, SI is also subject to ethical scrutiny.
Given that our goal is to
elucidate the notion of accuracy in SI we will assess the ethical implications
of SI as an action. There are two distinct possibilities of performing such
assessment, relying on two distinct types of ethical theories, i.e.
teleological and deontological theories. Teleological theories postulate the ethical
examination of an action’s consequences. In other words, according to
teleological theories, an action is deemed good
(thus obligatory) whenever its consequences are. This begs the question whom
the consequences of an action are good for. Depending on the beneficiary of an
action we distinguish between egoism, altruism and utilitarianism, of which the
latter principle is most prominent in current philosophical debates. According
to utilitarianism, a good action is
one generating the greatest happiness for the largest possible number of people
(cf. Audi 1995: 494ff). Deontological theories, on the other hand, do not focus
on the consequences of an action, but rather on the intention thereof. They
revolve around principles of justice and honesty of the intention of the
action's author.
Using the above example, we
can draw some tentative conclusions with regard to the interpreter's action,
more specifically his decision (D) to change the proposition (P) both verbally
(v) and semantically (s), to implement the intentional (i) component.
5.1 Teleological ethics
We have seen that utilitarian
(teleological) ethics considers an action to be good when the consequences
contribute to the attaining of a goal shared by the largest number of people
concerned. In our example this would include the speakers, the listeners, the
interpreters, in other words all conference participants. The interpreter has
to assess what consequences Di (i.e. the decision to base the
interpretation mainly on the perceived intentional message component) entails,
and based on this assessment whether Di is good.
If the interpreter opts for Di
his action may have the following consequences. Firstly, the rendition will
depart further from the verbal and semantic information contained in the source
text. Whereas some interpreters and interpreter researchers may view this as a
betrayal of the speaker, we see the task of the interpreter to convey the message, in other words all three
components. Secondly, in the above example, the interpreter's decision most
likely avoids an insult that was never meant to be. Having said that the
interpreter can never be absolutely sure about any speaker's intention, nor
about the quantity and quality of the consequences his actions entail.
If, on the other hand, the interpreter
opts for Ds, the decision to draw only on verbal and semantic
components of the message, the following scenario is likely to occur. Firstly,
the rendition will be semantically close to the original, and therefore an
adequate interpretation according to some SI scholars. Secondly, in the above
example, a semantically close interpretation of the message most likely would
have been perceived as an insult. Taking this thought a bit further, we could
well imagine a diplomatic incident, with the MC getting sacked and the African
dignitary opting for a early departure.
The main problem for the
interpreter working simultaneously of course is time or the lack thereof.
Indeed he only has a split second to contemplate about the possible
consequences of his actions, which constitutes the very basis on which he
answers the question about whether Di is good or not.
5.2 Deontological ethics
Unlike teleological ethics,
which tries to answer the above question based on its consequences,
deontological theories attempt to answer the same question by assessing the
reasons for the decision without regarding its effects.
If the interpreter in our
example decides not to take into account the intentional component of the
message it may be because as an interpreter he does not feel responsible for
the message's content or does not dare guess the speaker's objective. He takes
this decision because he does not believe he can correctly conjecture the true
intention of the speaker, but wants to perform to the best of his abilities.
From a purely deontological perspective thus in the mentioned example, Ds
is good, even if the African head of
state decides to leave the conference early because he feels insulted.
It is not our intention to
argue in favor of one or the other ethical position, particularly because all
ethical decisions draw on both factors, intentions and consequences (e.g. a
good intention may be motivated by an assessment of the potential consequences
of a particular action). In fact, we believe it is up to each and every
interpreter to make that decision. What we do want to point out, however, is
that the choice among Dv, Ds or Di depends on
a variety of considerations. This is why what on the surface looks like a
betrayal of the speaker, may actually be an ethically justified interpretation
of the original.
6. The VSI model of truthful rendition in simultaneous interpreting
In the preceding discussion
we underscored the importance of three message components when attempting to
produce a truthful rendition. We therefore propose the following model which we
call the VSI model of truthful rendition in simultaneous interpreting.
We argued that any source
message consists of three components (verbal, semantic and intentional), and
that the interpreter's task becomes particularly delicate when the three don’t
seem to be congruent. In that case the interpreter will have to decide which of
the message components to rely on principally (Dv, Ds or
Di) so as to attain a truthful rendition. Our model is merely a
simplified visualization of the factors enabling the interpreter to produce a
truthful rendition of the original. It shows that the farther the interpreter
moves away from verbal information, the more he needs to complement the message
with semantic and intentional components. It is important to point out that the
original message always contains all
three levels of information, verbal, semantic and intentional. However, it is
up to the interpreter to assess the amount of each kind of information he
chooses or needs to use in order to attain the goal of a truthful rendition.
7. Conclusion
In his handbook for the
interpreter, Herbert points out that “[t]he conference interpreter is an
assistant whose intelligent contribution is an indispensable factor in any
international gathering” and goes on to say that “[t]he interpreter should
never forget that the immediate and essential object of his work is to enable
his audience to know accurately what the speaker intended to convey, and to
make on the audience the impression which the speaker wishes to make.” (Herbert
1956). Birse, one of Gorbachev’s personal interpreters, says, “[a]ccuracy in
translation was of vital importance” immediately qualifying the statement by
adding that “[s]ometimes a totally different word or phrase served better as
giving the precise meaning and intention of the speaker who was thinking aloud
in his own language” (1967: 108). It appears, thus, that both Herbert's and
Birse's early notions of accuracy are compatible with our definition of a
truthful rendition.
We have seen in our example
that the interpreter chooses not to interpret a particular clause probably
feeling that - although perhaps an attempt at humor - it is inadequate. But
does the interpreter have the right and/or the authority to do that? What we
cannot do and do not want to do is to
argue in favor of giving the interpreter a blank check to modify the original
message at his discretion. After all, interpreters are to be transmitters, not
holders of information (cf. Neumann- Solow 1981).
Although the VSI model
describes communication processes the interpreter is regularly confronted with,
it does not give any indication as to which course of action is most
appropriate to achieve a truthful rendition of the original. The latter entails
a decision by each and every interpreter that may be based on deontological or
teleological considerations or both.
Amongst the difficulties of
making an ethical decision leading to a truthful rendition are the constraints
under which the simultaneous interpreter performs his task. Stress, lack of
time, high demands on cognitive resources are all factors that render ethical
decision-making extremely difficult, which is why these issues should already
be addressed during interpreter training as well as by professional
interpreters whilst not in the booth. This would then enable them to react more
rapidly and in coherence with ethical principles when faced with the situation
in real life.
8. References
Audi, R. (1995) The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baker, M. (1992) In Other Words: A Coursebook on Translation. London: Routledge.
Barik,
H.C. (1969) A study of simultaneous interpretation. Unpublished thesis,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
BBC
(2004) Breaking the Language Barrier. Written and presented by James Robbins,
produced by Philippa Goodrich. Broadcast on BBC Radio 4 on 24 January.
Birse, A.H. (1967) Memoirs of an interpreter. London: Joseph.
Chesterman, A. (1997) Memes of Translation: The Spread of Ideas in Translation Theory.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Chesterman, A. (2001) Proposal for a Hieronymic Oath.
The translator, 7(2), 139-154.
Gaiba, F. (1998) The Origins of Simultaneous
Interpretation: The Nuremberg Trial. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press.
Jakobson, Roman (1959) On linguistic aspects of
translation. In R. A. Brower (ed.) On
Translation, (pp. 232-239) Cabridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Koller, W. (1992)
Einführung in die Übersetzungswissenschaft.
Heidelberg,Wiesbaden: Quelle &
Meyer.
Kopczynski, A. (1980) Conference interpreting: Some
linguistic and communicative problems. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
University of Poznan.
Mikkelson, H. (1995) On the horns of a dilemma: Accuracy vs.
Brevity in the use of legal terms by court interpreters. In M. Marshall (ed) Translation and the Law (pp 201-XXX).
Mikkelson, H. (2000) Interpreter ethics: A review of the
traditional and electronic literature. Interpreting 5:1, 49–56.
Neumann Solow, S. (1981) Sign Language Interpreting: a
basic resource book. Maryland: The National Association of the Deaf.
Nida, E. (1964) Principles of Correspondence. In L.
Venuti (ed) The Translation Studies
Reader. London: Routledge.
Pym, A. (1992). Translation and text transfer: An
essay on the principles of intercultural communication. Frankfurt am Main:
Peter Lang.
Robins, J. (2004) Breaking the Language Barrier. BBC Radio 4: 24.01.2004.
Seeber, K.G. (2002a) Das Dolmetschen im medizinischen Bereich (Teil I), Das Zeichen 16: 59, 98-115.
Seeber, K.G. (2002b) Das Dolmetschen im medizinischen Bereich (Teil II), Das Zeichen 16: 60, 256-275.
Snell-Hornby, M. (1988) Translation Studies: An Integrated Approach. Philadelphia:
Benjamins.
Sunnari, M. (1995) Processing strategies in
simultaneous interpreting: “saying it all” vs. synthesis. In J. Tommola (Ed)
Topics in interpreting research, (pp.109-119), Turku: University of Turku.
Venuti, L. (1998). The scandals of translation:
towards an ethics of difference. London: Routledge.
Vermeer, H. (1989) Skopos and Commission in
Translational Activity. In L. Venuti (ed) The Translation Studies Reader. London: Routledge.
Wadensjö, C. (1998)
Interpreting as Interaction.
London & New York: Longman.
Link: Meta
(C) 2007 by Christian Zelger